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experienced	 a	 profound	 change	 in	 their	 political	 status.	 Using	 data	 from	 two	
large-scale	opinion	surveys	that	we	conducted	in	1998	and	2015	respectively,	we	










Political	 scientists	 commonly	 distinguish	 between	 two	 types	 of	 political	 units:	 sovereign	
states	and	subnational	administrations	such	as	federal	states,	provinces,	and	municipalities.	
Yet	 this	distinction	overlooks	a	 third	category	 that	 is	comprised	of	 so-called	non-sovereign	
territories,	which	in	many	ways	can	be	seen	as	political	hybrids,	enjoying	some	but	not	all	of	




In	 spite	of	 their	 growing	 legitimacy,	however,	 	 non-sovereign	political	 arrangements	 share	
their	 own	 distinct	 problems.	 These	may	 arise	 from	 their	 generally	 small	 scale,	 from	 their	
constitutional	status,	or	from	a	combination	of	both.	In	this	article	we	examine	and	highlight	
the	 benefits	 and	 downsides	 of	 non-sovereignty,	 as	 they	 are	 identified,	 perceived,	 and	
recognized	by	the	inhabitants	of	these	territories	themselves.	In	doing	so,	we	zoom	in	on	the	
six	 Caribbean	 islands	 that	 are	 constitutionally	 part	 of	 the	Kingdom	of	 the	Netherlands.	 By	
means	of	a	comparison	between	two	opinion	surveys	that	were	conducted	on	these	islands	
in	1998	and	2015	respectively,	we	demonstrate	that	the	inhabitants	of	the	Dutch	Caribbean	
islands	 increasingly	 experience	 a	 so-called	 head-versus-heart	 dilemma,	 in	 which	 non-
sovereignty	 is	 perceived	 as	 a	 rationally	 pragmatic,	 yet	 emotionally	 and/or	 ideologically	
unsatisfactory	 political	 arrangement.	 Our	 analysis	 also	 reveals	 that	 the	 increasingly	
significant	 role	 of	 the	 Netherlands	 on	 these	 islands	 has	 resulted	 in	 augmented	 resistance	
towards	the	Dutch	metropolis,	even	if	the	more	material	benefits	of	the	constitutional	 link	
with	The	Netherlands	remain	strongly	relevant	to	the	island	populations.		
The	 existence	 of	 myriad	 former	 colonies	 that	 have	 not	 made	 the	 transition	 towards	
independent	 states	 is	 a	 counterintuitive	 outcome	 of	 the	 supposedly	 global	 process	 of	
decolonization	which	started	in	the	Americas	almost	250	years	ago	and	swept	over	Asia	and	
Africa	since	the	mid-1940s.	Why	did	decolonization	not	result	in	the	complete	dismissal	of	all	
former	 colonial	 empires?	 A	 decisive	 factor	 has	 been	 that	 in	 the	 final	 round	 of	 Western	
decolonization,	 former	 colonial	 states	 and	 former	 colonies	 reached	 some	 sort	 of	 political	
arrangement	short	of	independence.	Today,	these	‘confetti	of	empire’	(Guillebaud	1976)	lay	
scattered	 across	 the	 globe,	mainly	 situated	 in	 the	 Atlantic,	 Caribbean,	 the	 Pacific	 and	 the	
Indian	 Ocean.	 With	 a	 few	 exceptions,	 they	 are	 all	 islands,	 and	 the	 wide	 majority	 have	
populations	 of	 less	 than	 half	 a	 million,	 many	 even	 less	 than	 100,000.	 As	 independent	
entities,	 the	 overwhelming	 majority	 would	 qualify	 as	 micro-states.	 Under	 some	 sort	 of	
postcolonial	 umbrella,	 they	 are	 formally	 all	 democracies,	 with	 their	 local	 parliament	 and	
government	 constituted	 through	 open	 electoral	 processes.	 Ultimately	 however,	 they	 are	
either	integrated	in,	or	subsumed	under	the	authority	of	a	larger	metropolitan	state.		
The	 populations	 of	 some	 of	 these	 non-sovereign	 jurisdictions,	 especially	 those	 in	 the	





and	 have	 to	 deal	 with	 metropolitan	 interventions	 and	 officials,	 resulting	 in	 routine	






non-sovereign	 entities	 are	 on	 average	 better	 off	 economically,	 can	 rely	 on	 metropolitan	
protection	for	the	functioning	of	democracy,	human	rights	and	territorial	integrity,	and	their	
citizens	have	 the	passport	of,	and	hence	 the	 right	of	abode	 in	 the	metropolis	 (Aldrich	and	
Connell	 1998,	 Baldacchino	 and	 Milne	 2006,	 [omitted]).	 Apparently	 these	 material	
advantages	 are	 valued	 above	 the	 more	 abstract	 values	 embodied	 by	 the	 choice	 for	
independence,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 everyday	 predicament	 of	 living	 a	 post-,	 or	 if	 you	 will	 neo-
colonial	condition.		
In	 this	 contribution,	we	 focus	on	one	particularly	well-documented	segment	of	 the	overall	
non-sovereign	world,	 the	Caribbean	parts	of	the	Kingdom	of	the	Netherlands.1	Following	a	
sketch	 of	 the	 relevant	 constitutional	 and	 political	 developments,	 we	 zoom	 in	 on	 the	
repercussions	of	increasingly	interventionist	Dutch	policies	since	the	1990s.	To	this	end,	we	
compare	 the	 outcomes	 of	 two	 large-scale	 surveys	 held	 on	 these	 islands,	 one	 in	 1998,	
another	 in	 2015.	 These	 surveys	 document	 deeply	 ambiguous	 insular	 feelings,	 an	
ambivalence	which	 in	 turn	 leads	 to	 urgent	 questions	 about	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 Dutch	
policies.	 In	 the	 conclusion,	 we	 discuss	 the	 broader	 relevance	 of	 these	 findings	 in	




While	 the	 conventional	 wisdom	 of	 the	 mid-20th	 century	 dictated	 that	 decolonization	 is	
analogous	 to	 the	attainment	of	 independence,	 the	emergence	of	non-sovereign	 territories	
around	the	world	has	strongly	challenged	this	notion	(Hintjens	1997,	Miles	2001,	Clegg	and	
Pantojas-García	2009).	The	outcome	of	enduring	non-sovereignty	resulted	from	non-violent,	
fairly	 transparent	and	 internationally	 sanctioned	political	processes	 in	 the	post-World	War	




jurisdictions	 frequently.	 There	 is	 not	 one	 single	 instance	 of	 a	 former	metropolitan	 power	








There	 are	 certainly	 metropolitan	 interests	 in	 maintaining	 the	 status	 quo.	 These	 are	
particularly	evident	for	larger	metropolitan	powers	such	as	France,	the	United	Kingdom	and	
the	 United	 States,	 the	 latter	 a	 late	 but	 active	 participant	 in	 Western	 colonialism.	 For	
geopolitical	reasons,	these	states	value	their	constitutional	presence	across	various	parts	of	
the	 globe.	 Military	 and	 political	 strategy	 may	 be	 the	 leading	 concern,	 but	 there	 are	 also	
economic	 motives,	 particularly	 as	 the	 possession	 of	 isolated	 islands	 implies	 a	 claim	 to	
significant	parts	of	the	surrounding	waters.	Likewise,	the	British	presence	in	places	such	as	
Gibraltar	and	the	Falkland	Islands/Malvinas,	the	French	presence	in	the	sparsely	populated	







At	 present,	 in	 international	 politics	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 enduring	 non-sovereignty	 is	 not	





in,	 or	 some	 sort	 of	 constitutional	 association	 with	 the	 former	 colonial	 state	 is	 equally	
acceptable.	 This	 new	 consensus	 gives	 priority	 to	 the	 self-determination	 of	 the	 (former)	
colony	 and	 implies	 that	 a	 former	 metropolitan	 state	 can	 neither	 refuse	 the	 transfer	 of	
sovereignty	nor	impose	a	constitutional	farewell	on	an	unwilling	population	(Hintjens	1997;	




A	 considerable	 number	 of	 the	 non-sovereign	 entities	 are	 located	 in	 the	 Caribbean.	
Decolonization	 started	 early	 with	 the	 independence	 of	 Haiti	 (1804),	 followed	 by	 the	
Dominican	Republic	(1822)	and	Cuba	(1901).	After	World	War	Two,	much	of	the	British	West	
Indies	 followed	 the	 same	 course	 (1962-1983),	 as	 did	 Suriname	 (1975).	 However,	 France	
retained	its	colonies,	officially	designated	as	overseas	provinces	(Départements	d’Outre	Mer)	
in	1946.	The	United	States	is	still	constitutionally	present	in	the	so-called	Commonwealth	of	
Puerto	 Rico	 as	well	 as	 the	 U.S.	 Virgin	 Islands,	 as	 are	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 in	 a	 handful	 of	
Overseas	 Territories	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 in	 six	 Antillean	 islands.	 With	 the	 exception	 of	
Puerto	Rico	 (with	 some	4	million	 inhabitants),	 all	 of	 these	 entities	 have	 small	 populations	





There	 are	 highly	 diverse	 constitutional	 frameworks	 for	 non-sovereignty	 in	 the	 Caribbean,	
ranging	 from	quasi-colonial	 constructions	 such	 as	 the	British	Overseas	 Territories	where	 a	
British	 governor	 has	 ultimate	 power;	 via	 near-complete	 integration	 as	 overseas	
departments,	 such	 as	 the	 French	 Caribbean;	 to	 constructions	 such	 as	 the	 quasi-federal	
Statuut,	 or	 the	 sui	 generis	 status	 of	 Puerto	 Rico	 as	 a	 Commonwealth	 or	 Estado	 Libre	
Asociado.	 Degrees	 of	 autonomy	 vary	 considerably	 among	 these	 variants,	 but	 all	 leave	
ultimate	power	with	the	metropolitan	state.	The	legitimacy	of	these	political	arrangements	
is	 defended	 by	 referring	 to	 non-sovereignty	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 self-determination	
confirmed	 in	plebiscites	and	elections.	More	often	than	not,	such	electoral	processes	have	
been	 organized	 post	 hoc,	 to	 ascertain	 a	 population’s	 opinion	 about	 some	 sort	 of	
construction	introduced	earlier	on	the	basis	of	negotiations	by	political	elites.	










with	 six	 tiny	 islands	 in	 the	 Caribbean,	 colonized	 in	 the	 1630s.	 There	 has	 been	 no	
decolonization	 in	 the	 classical	 sense,	 meaning	 the	 transfer	 of	 sovereignty	 from	 the	
metropolis	 to	the	former	colonies.	Rather,	since	constitutional	 restructuring	 in	2010,	 three	
of	 the	 islands	 (Aruba,	 Curaçao	 and	 St.	 Maarten,	 together	 accounting	 for	 some	 300,000	
people)	 are	 autonomous	 countries	 within	 the	 Kingdom,	 while	 the	 least	 populated	 ones	
(Bonaire,	 St.	 Eustatius	 and	 Saba,	 totaling	 just	 over	 25,000)	 have	 become	 public	 bodies	 or	
‘overseas	municipalities’	of	the	Netherlands.	
The	Dutch	Caribbean	is	the	remnant	of	a	once	impressive	colonial	empire	with	its	center	of	
gravity	 in	 Asia	 ([omitted]).	 The	 core	 of	 Dutch	 colonialism	 was	 situated	 in	 the	 Dutch	 East	
Indies.	Here	classical	colonialism	–	based	on	economic	and	geopolitical	 interests	combined	
with	administrative	zeal	–	was	abruptly	ended	by	a	classical	decolonization	struggle	marked	
by	 bloody	 battles	 and	 protracted	 negotiations,	 subsequently	 poisoning	 postcolonial	
relations.	 Concurrent	 with	 this	 arduous	 process,	 The	 Hague	 developed	 a	 decolonization	
policy	for	its	Caribbean	colonies.	The	outcome	was	the	Statuut	or	Charter	for	the	Kingdom	of	
the	 Netherlands,	 proclaimed	 in	 1954.	 The	 Charter	 defined	 the	 Kingdom	 as	 a	 voluntary	






the	 partners	 involved:	 full	 sovereignty	 for	 the	 former	 Caribbean	 colonies	 or,	 conversely,	
complete	integration	into	the	metropolis	as	provinces.	
According	 to	 the	Charter’s	preamble,	 the	 three	 countries	 ‘take	 care	of	 their	own	 interests	




Dutch	 cabinet	 expanded	 to	 include	 one	 plenipotentiary	 minister	 for	 each	 of	 the	 two	
Caribbean	 territories.	 The	 initial	 idea	 to	 inaugurate	 a	 Kingdom	 parliament	 to	 which	 this	
expanded	 government	would	 be	 accountable	was	 abandoned,	 resulting	 in	 the	 democratic	
deficit	 of	 a	 Kingdom	government	without	 a	 corresponding	 Kingdom	parliament	 (Hillebrink	








the	 same	 outcome.	 The	 decision	 of	 the	 Surinamese	 cabinet	 to	 work	 towards	 immediate	
independence	was	unique:	no	previous	government	in	Suriname	had	seriously	done	this,	and	
a	 highly	 divided	 parliament	 supported	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 negotiations	 with	 the	 Dutch	
government	with	a	majority	of	literally	one	vote	only.	No	plebiscite	was	held,	and	one-third	





opposite.	 There	 was	 a	 consistent	 refusal	 to	 cut	 the	 umbilical	 cord	 with	 the	 former	
metropolis,	as	well	as	decreasing	enthusiasm	for	keeping	the	six	islands	together.	It	took	the	
Dutch	long	to	accept	that	independence	could	not	be	imposed	on	the	islands,	and	that	the	
centrifugal	 tendencies	 could	 not	 be	 kept	 in	 check.	 But	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 Netherlands	
Antilles	 was	 the	 outcome	 anyway.	 In	 1996,	 Aruba	 reached	 a	 separate	 status	 within	 the	
Kingdom	 but	 outside	 of	 the	 Netherlands	 Antilles.	 In	 2010	 the	 latter	 entity	 was	 dissolved	





Netherlands	 and	 the	Dutch	 Caribbean.	 Thus,	 the	 four	 countries	 presently	 constituting	 the	
Kingdom	 –	 Aruba,	 Curaçao,	 St.	 Maarten	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 itself	 –	 are	 autonomous	 in	
internal	 affairs,	 but	 Kingdom	affairs	 are	decided	upon	by	 the	 government	of	 the	Kingdom	
dominated	 by	 the	 Dutch	 cabinet.	 Clearly	 this	 is	 not	 a	 perfect	 postcolonial	 arrangement.	
There	is	a	political,	economic,	and	demographic	asymmetry,	and		in	addition	there	are	also	






The	 arguments	 are	 clear,	 as	we	will	 discuss	 in	more	 detail	 below.	 Antilleans	 feel	 that	 the	
Kingdom	 guarantees	 democracy,	 human	 rights	 and	 liberties,	 and	 territorial	 integrity;	
provides	 development	 funds	 and	 makes	 the	 islands	 a	 more	 trustworthy	 focus	 of	 foreign	
investments;	 and	 appreciate	 that	 Dutch	 citizenship	 implies	 the	 right	 of	 abode	 in	 the	
Netherlands	 and	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 at	 large,	 encompassing	 access	 to	 high-quality	











no	 plebiscites	 preceding	 the	 transfer	 of	 sovereignty	 to	 the	 former	 colonies	 of	 the	 British	
West	Indies.	As	for	Suriname,	its	ruling	pro-independence	coalition	refused	to	organize	one	
out	 of	 well-founded	 fears	 of	 rejection,	 and	 was	 quietly	 supported	 in	 this	 by	 a	 Dutch	
government	keen	on	an	immediate	transfer	of	sovereignty.								
As	for	the	Dutch	Caribbean,	the	proclamation	of	the	Statuut	in	December	1954	had	been	the	








referendums	 date	 from	 1993-1994	 and	 several	 more	 followed.	 In	 addition,	 there	 were	
several	extensive	surveys	which	help	us	tracing	developments	over	time.	
In	Table	1,	the	support	for	independence	as	expressed	in	various	referendums	and	opinion	
polls	between	1974	and	2015	has	been	presented.	 The	 interpretation	of	 general	 trends	 is	
slightly	 complicated,	 as	 most	 referendums	 about	 constitutional	 affairs	 addressed	 two	
different	 issues	 at	 the	 same	 time:	 the	 question	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 the	 structure	 of	 the	
Netherlands	Antilles.	The	overall	picture	is	clear	regarding	the	first	issue.	On	the	one	hand,	
there	 is	 an	 overall	 pattern	 of	 low	 support	 for	 independence.	 The	 one	 apparent	 exception	
pertains	 to	 Aruba	 in	 1977,	 but	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 option	 of	 ‘independence’	was	 primarily	
meant	 to	 signify	 a	 secession	 from	 the	 Netherlands	 Antilles,	 rather	 than	 from	 the	
transatlantic	Kingdom	(Alofs	and	Merkies	2001).	This	is	confirmed	by	the	sharp	drop	of	the	
pro-independence	 vote	 after	 attainment	 of	 the	 separate	 autonomous	 country	 status	 in	
1986.		
Table	1:	Dutch	Caribbean:	Support	for	full	independence2	
	 Aruba	 Bonaire	 Curaçao	 Saba	 St.	Eustatius	 St.	
Maarten	
1974	 28	%	 -	 14	%	 -	 -	 -	
1977	 82	%	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	
1985	 10	%	 -	 12	%	 -	 -	 -	
1993-94	 0.5	%	 0.2	%	 0.5	%	 0.5	%	 0.2	%	 6.3	%	
1998	 5.2	%	 1.8	%	 6.6	%	 0.0	%	 1.5	%	 15.3	%	
2000	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 14.4	%	
2004-05	 -	 0.5	%	 4.8	%	 0.8	%	 0.6	%	 -	
2015	 7.4	%	 2.6	%	 14.4	%	 3.2	%	 7.3	%	 -	
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 while	 the	 pro-independence	 vote	 was	 low	 in	 the	 1970s	 (apart	 from	
Aruba,	 1977)	 and	 1980s,	 and	 even	 dropped	 afterwards	 throughout	 the	 1990s	 and	 2000s,	
there	 is	 a	 slight	but	nevertheless	 remarkable	 increase	of	 this	preference	 in	2015.	This,	we	
assume,	reflects	an	uneasiness	with	the	growing	role	of	Dutch	government	and	visibility	of	
Dutch	people	on	the	islands.			









remaining	Antilles-of-five	 initially	preferred	 the	status	quo,	even	 in	St.	Maarten	which	had	
taken	the	place	of	Aruba	as	second	largest	island.	But	once	St.	Maarten’s	population,	urged	
to	do	so	by	 local	politicians,	voted	for	secession	 in	2000,	the	fragile	construction	collapsed	
and	 even	 the	 voters	 in	 Curaçao	 itself	 opted	 the	 status	 of	 autonomous	 country	 in	 the	
Kingdom.	The	inhabitants	of	the	three	smallest	islands	(Bonaire,	St.	Eustatius,	and	Saba)	had	
little	 effective	 choice.	 While	 Bonaireans	 and	 Sabans	 opted	 for	 direct	 ties	 with	 the	




island	 Netherlands	 Antilles,	 this	 option	 is	 supported	 by	 a	 quarter	 to	 one	 third	 of	 the	
population	of	other	islands	([omitted]).	There	is	no	way	back	though.	The	Dutch	government	
has	made	 it	 clear	 that	 it	 will	 not	 consider	 yet	 another	 round	 of	 constitutional	 changes	 –	
implicitly	underlining	its	hegemony	in	the	entire	process.			
One	debate	 that	has	 come	up	 though	 in	 recent	 years	 is	whether	 the	 so-called	BES	 islands	
(Bonaire,	 St.	Eustatius,	 and	Saba)	 really	 got	where	 they	opted	 for.	 The	number	of	options	
given	 in	 the	 recent	 referenda	 was	 limited,	 and	 critics	 have	 complained	 that	 the	 quasi-
municipal	 arrangements	 ultimately	 made	 for	 Bonaire,	 St.	 Eustatius	 and	 Saba	 do	 not	
correspond	to	the	option	of	 ‘direct	ties	with	the	Netherlands’	offered	and	preferred	 in	the	
decisive	referendum	(Duijf	and	Soons	2011).	This	is	most	strongly	the	case	for	St.	Eustatius,	
where	 over	 three	 quarters	 of	 voters	 preferred	 a	 return	 to	 the	Netherlands	Antilles	 in	 the	
2005	 referendum,	 and	 never	 expressed	 a	 preference	 for	 direct	 ties	 with	 the	 Netherlands	
(Corbin	2012).	A	2014	 referendum	on	 this	 island	 resulted	 in	approximately	65.5%	of	votes	
for	 ‘autonomy’,	while	32.8%	of	votes	were	cast	 in	 favor	of	 the	municipal	 status.	Since	 this	
referendum	 however	 did	 not	 reach	 the	 required	 voter	 turnout	 of	 60%,	 it	 was	 declared	
invalid.		A	non-binding	referendum	held	in	Bonaire	in	2015	likewise	indicated	that	two-thirds	
of	 all	 respondents	 disagreed	with	 the	 new	 status,	 i.e.	 direct	 links	with	 the	Netherlands,	 a	
view	confirmed	in	our	survey	([omitted]).		
Beyond	these	issues	of	constitutional	status,	there	is	a	host	of	other	questions,	the	answers	
to	which	may	 help	 us	 to	 understand	 the	 dynamics	 of	 this	 particular	 case	 on	 the	 broader	
canvas	 of	 postcolonial	 non-sovereignty.	 To	 this	 end,	 we	 will	 compare	 two	 large-scale	
surveys,	one	co-supervised	by	one	of	the	authors	in	the	winter	of	1997-1998,	the	second	by	











2015	 survey	 in	 turn	 was	 held	 after	 three	 decades	 of	 increasing	 Dutch	 intervention	 in	









broadly	 similar	 issues	 and	 topics,	 but	 the	 exact	 formulation	 of	 questions	 and	 answer	
categories	was	often	different.	This	is	both	a	result	of	political	and	societal	developments	as	
a	consequence	of	which	some	questions	of	the	1998	survey	had	to	be	reformulated,	as	well	
as	 a	 pre-test	 of	 the	 2015	 survey	 that	 showed	 a	 need	 to	 restate	 some	 of	 the	 questions.5	
Additional,	 detailed	 information	 about	 the	methodological	 set-up	 of	 both	 opinion	 surveys	
can	be	found	in	the	original	publications.		








As	 we	 discussed	 above,	 pragmatic	 arguments	 in	 favor	 of	 non-sovereignty	 often	 relate	 to	
military	and	 judicial	protection,	nationality	and	the	right	of	abode,	economic	development	
and	 financial	 support,	and	administrative	supervision.	These	 four	 issues	were	addressed	 in	
both	 the	 1998	 and	 the	 2015	 survey	 –	 though	 judicial	 protection	 only	 indirectly,	 as	 an	














Table	 2:	 Percentage	 of	 people	 who	 state	 that	 Dutch	 military	 support	 is	 important	 or	
necessary	
	 Aruba	 Bonaire	 Curaçao	 Saba	 St.	Eustatius	 St.	Maarten	
1998	 95.3	%	 96.1	%	 92.5	%	 93.7	%	 94.9	%	 89.6	%	
2015	 91.6	%	 90.3	%	 78.3	%	 91.7	%	 90.1	%	 -	
	
As	 the	 table	 reveals,	 both	 in	 1998	 and	 in	 2015	 overwhelming	 majorities	 of	 the	 island	
populations	 considered	military	 support	 from	 the	Netherlands	 to	 be	 necessary.	While	 the	
percentages	of	support	in	2015	are	slightly	lower	than	in	1998,	on	all	islands	except	Curaçao	
over	90%	of	respondents	emphasize	the	importance	of	Dutch	military	support.	And	even	on	
Curaçao,	which	 is	 the	 largest	 of	 the	 six	 islands,	more	 than	 three	 quarters	 of	 interviewees	
continue	to	stress	the	need	for	military	support.	The	somewhat	lower	percentages	of	2015	in	
comparison	to	1998	might	result	from	a	slightly	different	formulation	of	the	question:	while	
the	 1998	 survey	 asked	 respondents	 whether	 military	 support	 was	 important,	 the	 2015	
survey	asked	respondents	if	military	support	was	necessary.	It	is	plausible	that	this	marginal	








questions	 reveals	 that	 Dutch	 military	 support	 is	 considered	 slightly	 more	 important	 than	
support	against	international	crime:	while	the	former	question	generally	results	in	over	90%	
in	 favor	 of	 Dutch	 support,	 the	 question	 about	 international	 crime	 commonly	 results	 in	
between	80	and	90%	support.			
	
Table	3:	Percentage	of	people	who	state	 that	Dutch	 support	against	 international	 crime	 is	
necessary	
	 Aruba	 Bonaire	 Curaçao	 Saba	 St.	Eustatius	 St.	Maarten	
1998	 82.8	%	 84.8	%	 88.3	%	 92.1	%	 83.8	%	 85.6	%	
2015	 81.3	%	 90.3	%	 80.0	%	 88.3	%	 88.1	%	 -	
	
A	second	issue	we	addressed	is	financial	support.	While	there	may	be	other,	more	indirect	
economic	 and	 financial	 benefits	 of	 non-sovereignty,	we	 considered	 financial	 support	 from	
12	
	
the	metropolitan	 country	 (the	Netherlands)	 to	 be	 the	most	 tangible	manifestation	 of	 this	




	 Aruba	 Bonaire	 Curaçao	 Saba	 St.	Eustatius	 St.	Maarten	
1998	 91.5	%	 94.5	%	 94.2	%	 96.3	%	 94.9	%	 81.5	%	




result	 of	 a	 small	 difference	 in	 answer	 categories:	 while	 the	 1998	 survey	 only	 offers	 two	
answer	categories	(‘yes’	and	‘no’)	for	this	question,	the	2015	survey	offers	an	intermediate	
alternative	 (‘not	 necessary,	 but	 also	 not	 unnecessary’).	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 some	 people	
answered	 the	 1998	 question	 with	 ‘yes’	 because	 they	 were	 faced	 with	 a	 binary	 choice,	
whereas	 they	 actually	 preferred	 an	 intermediate	 answer.	 This	 option	was	 provided	 in	 the	
2015	survey.	That	being	 said,	 in	2015	over	80%	of	people	on	all	 islands	consider	enduring	
financial	 support	 from	the	metropolitan	Netherlands	necessary.	The	 results	also	appear	 to	
show	 a	 population	 effect:	 on	 the	 smallest	 islands	 (Bonaire,	 Saba,	 and	 St.	 Eustatius)	 the	
percentages	are	even	higher	than	on	the	larger	ones,	possibly	indicating	that	the	inhabitants	





Table	 5:	 Percentage	 of	 people	 who	 state	 that	 their	 right	 to	 live	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 is	
important	
	 Aruba	 Bonaire	 Curaçao	 Saba	 St.	Eustatius	 St.	Maarten	
1998	 81.7	%	 81.9	%	 78.7	%	 78.8	%	 84.8	%	 68.6	%	




similar,	 this	 cannot	 explain	 the	 difference.	 While	 majorities	 on	 all	 islands	 continue	 to	








they	 are	 a	 minority’),	 or	 a	 combination	 of	 both.	 But	 we	 have	 not	 conducted	 follow-up	
research	on	this.	
Finally,	 in	 both	 surveys	 a	 question	was	 asked	 about	Dutch	 administrative	 supervision.	 For	
this	issue,	the	2015	question	differed	markedly	from	the	question	that	was	asked	in	the	1998	





dominance.	 In	 the	 1998	 survey,	 people	were	 also	 asked	 if	 the	Netherlands	 interferes	 too	








	 Aruba	 Bonaire	 Curaçao	 Saba	 St.	Eustatius	 St.	Maarten	
1998a	 86.4	%	 87.4	%	 85.2	%	 91.5	%	 85.4	%	 70.9	%	
1998b	 48.7	%	 52.4	%	 50.7	%	 73.5	%	 75.8	%	 47.9	%	
2015	 75.4	%	 48.6	%	 61.0	%	 60.8	%	 31.1	%	 -	
	 	
The	1998	 figures	point	 to	 an	evident	 discrepancy	between	people’s	 attitudes	 towards	 the	
safeguarding	 of	 democracy	 and	 rule	 of	 law	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 significant	 Dutch	
administrative	 interference	 on	 the	 other	 hand.	 	 While	 large	 majorities	 on	 all	 six	 islands	
indicate	that	they	value	the	Dutch	role	in	guaranteeing	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law,	much	
significant	 minorities	 believe	 that	 the	 Netherlands	 does	 interfere	 too	 much	 with	 the	
administration	of	 their	 island.	 In	 line	with	 the	head	versus	heart	dilemma,	 this	 shows	 that	
while	 people	 generally	 value	 the	more	 passive	 safeguarding	 role	 of	 the	Netherlands,	 they	
often	 object	 to	 perceived	 Dutch	 attempts	 to	 control	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 islands	 are	
administered.	The	2015	question,	which	can	arguably	be	seen	as	an	 intermediate	between	
the	 two	 1998	 questions,	 also	 receives	 in-between	 answers	 on	 Aruba	 and	 Curaçao,	where	
considerable	 majorities	 indicate	 that	 they	 appreciate	 Dutch	 administrative	 supervision.	
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However,	 the	 answers	 patterns	 of	 the	 three	 smallest	 islands	 are	 very	 remarkable.	 On	
Bonaire,	 Saba,	 and	St.	 Eustatius,	which	 since	2010	experienced	a	 strong	 increase	 in	Dutch	
administrative	supervision,	the	support	for	the	supervisory	role	of	the	Netherlands	has	faded	
significantly.	Support	 for	Dutch	administrative	supervision	 is	now	weaker	here	than	on	the	
two	 larger	 islands,	 and	 only	 on	 Saba	 do	 a	 majority	 of	 people	 still	 support	 Dutch	




Perhaps	 to	 a	 greater	 extent	 than	 military	 protection,	 financial	 support,	 and	 the	 right	 of	
abode,	administrative	supervision	is	likely	to	raise	sensations	of	(neo-)colonialism	and	Dutch	













the	 Dutch	 monarch;	 in	 1998	 this	 was	 Queen	 Beatrix,	 and	 in	 2015	 this	 was	 King	Willem-
Alexander.	While	people	might	have	different	attitudes	towards	these	two	different	rulers,	
their	composure	towards	the	islands	has	been	broadly	similar,	and	the	questions	therefore	





	 Aruba	 Bonaire	 Curaçao	 Saba	 St.	Eustatius	 St.	Maarten	
1998	 71.9	%	 62.3	%	 56.3	%	 86.2	%	 89.9	%	 74.5	%	




While	 the	 overall	 results	 indicate	 that	 the	 inhabitants	 of	 all	 six	 islands	 have	 a	 positive	
attitude	towards	the	monarchy,	there	are	divergences	between	the	islands	and	across	time.	
In	1998,	people	on	the	three	Windward	Islands	(Saba,	St.	Eustatius,	and	St.	Maarten)	clearly	
had	 a	more	 positive	 opinion	 about	Queen	 Beatrix	 than	 the	 people	 on	 the	 three	 Leeward	
Islands.	 In	 2015,	 this	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 reversed.	More	 specifically,	 while	 Arubans	 and	
Curaçaoans	 appear	 to	 have	 become	 increasingly	 positive	 about	 the	monarch	 in	 2015,	 on	
Saba	and	especially	St.	Eustatius	a	profound	drop	 in	the	popularity	of	 the	monarch	can	be	
observed.	While	 close	 to	90%	of	Sabans	and	Statians	had	a	positive	attitude	about	Queen	
Beatrix,	 only	 62%	 of	 Sabans	 and	 40%	 of	 Statians	 have	 a	 positive	 attitude	 towards	 King	
Willem-Alexander.	The	only	plausible	explanation	of	this	divergence	between	the	two	largest	
and	the	three	smallest	 islands	seems	to	be	their	different	constitutional	status	since	2010.	
The	 BES-islands	 are	 now	 special	 municipalities	 of	 the	 Netherlands,	 and	 objections	 to	 the	








Table	 8:	 Percentage	 of	 people	who	 think	 that	 Dutch	 politicians	 have	 knowledge	 of	 island	
culture	
	 Aruba	 Bonaire	 Curaçao	 Saba	 St.	Eustatius	 St.	Maarten	
1998	 26.5	%	 25.9	%	 29.9	%	 18.5	%	 15.7	%	 6.5	%	
2015	 15.5	%	 3.1	%	 10.1	%	 9.5	%	 5.9	%	 -	
	
Table	 9:	 Percentage	 of	 people	 who	 think	 that	 Dutch	 politicians	 have	 respect	 for	 island	
culture	
	 Aruba	 Bonaire	 Curaçao	 Saba	 St.	Eustatius	 St.	Maarten	
1998	 41.1	%	 45.3%	 42.8	%	 63.0	%	 50.5	%	 21.4	%	
2015	 19.6	%	 5.8	%	 11.2	%	 14.6	%	 6.0	%	 -	
	
The	answers	given	to	these	two	questions	show	an	unequivocal	and	worrying	pattern:	over	
the	past	 seventeen	years,	 island	populations	have	become	much	more	negative	about	 the	
perceived	 level	 of	 knowledge	 about,	 and	 respect	 for	 their	 islands.	While	 the	 1998	 –	 2015	





figures	on	Aruba	and	Curaçao.	Precisely	on	 these	 three	 islands,	 the	Dutch	dominance	and	
presence	 has	 strongly	 increased	 in	 recent	 years.	While	 the	 level	 of	Dutch	 engagement	 on	
Aruba	 and	 Curaçao	 had	 not	 changed	 as	 much	 over	 the	 past	 seventeen	 years,	 on	 these	
islands	 too	 people	 perceive	 much	 less	 knowledge	 and	 respect	 on	 the	 part	 of	 Dutch	
politicians.	 In	 sum,	 these	 questions	 clearly	 reveal	 that	 the	 islanders’	 emotional	 antipathy	
towards	the	Dutch	government	has	strongly	increased,	and	that	the	‘heart’-related	attitudes	
towards	the	non-sovereign	relationship	appear	to	have	become	much	more	negative.	
A	 third	 ‘heart’	 question	pertains	 to	 the	presence	of	Dutch	 inhabitants	 and	 tourists	 on	 the	
islands.	 This	 question	 was	 not	 asked	 in	 the	 1998	 survey,	 at	 a	 time	 when	 the	 physical	
presence	of	Dutch	people	was	much	less	significant	than	 it	 is	today.	Thus	we	cannot	make	





Table	10:	Percentage	of	people	who	 think	 that	 there	are	 too	many	Dutch	 inhabitants	 and	
tourists	on	the	island	
	 Aruba	 Bonaire	 Curaçao	 Saba	 St.	Eustatius	
2015	inhabitants	 42.4	%	 73.7	%	 54.6	%	 24.3	%	 35.1	%	
2015	tourists	 32.9	%	 45.3	%	 45.8	%	 8.3	%	 8.6	%	
	
The	results	point	to	some	striking	differences	between	the	five	surveyed	islands.	On	Bonaire	
and	 Curaçao,	 where	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 Dutch	 inhabitants	 has	 been	 the	most	
profound,	over	half	of	respondents	feel	that	there	are	too	many	Dutch	people	living	on	the	
island.	 These	 figures	 are	 much	 lower	 on	 Aruba,	 Saba,	 and	 St.	 Eustatius,	 although	 the	
proposition	 is	 still	 supported	 by	 a	 considerable	 minority	 of	 these	 islands’	 populations.	
Regarding	Dutch	tourists,	a	clear	division	between	the	two	Windward	Islands	(Saba	and	St.	
Eustatius)	and	the	other	three	islands	can	be	identified,	which	is	in	all	likelihood	a	result	of	
the	 fact	 that	 the	 ABC-islands	 experience	 a	much	 greater	 influx	 of	 Dutch	 tourists	 than	 the	
Windward	 Islands.	 In	 combination,	 the	 results	 therefore	 show	 that	 the	 antipathy	 towards	
Dutch	 inhabitants	 and	 tourists	 grows	 parallel	 to	 their	 numbers.	 These	 negative	 attitudes	
towards	Dutch	inhabitants	and	tourists	are	likely	to	increase	further	if	migration	and	tourism	
arrivals	continue	to	rise.	





in	 a	 different	 direction.	 In	 comparison	 to	 1998,	 inhabitants	 of	 all	 islands	 seem	 to	 have	




The	overall	outcomes	of	both	 the	1998	and	 the	2015	surveys	point	 to	a	 familiar	 theme	 in	
postcolonial	non-sovereign	societies:	 the	painful	 trade-off	between	head	and	heart.	For	all	






When	 asked	 whether	 their	 lives	 have	 improved	 during	 the	 five	 years	 after	 the	 new	
constitutional	 arrangements	 were	 implemented	 –	 and	 hence	 Dutch	 presence	 increased	 –	
Antilleans	express	slightly	negative	views.	When	asked	about	their	expectations	for	the	next	
five	 years	 though,	 the	 overall	 opinion	 is	 somewhat	 brighter	 ([omitted]).	 But	 none	 of	 this	
indicates	real	enthusiasm	or	optimism.	There	are	widespread	feelings	of	resentment	about	
the	 nature	 and	 impact	 of	 the	 increasingly	 strong	 Dutch	 presence,	 ranging	 from	 economic	







first	 lustrum	 of	 the	 new	 constitutional	 arrangements,	 this	 survey	 suggests	 the	 same	
ambivalence	 and	 very	 mixed	 appraisal	 of	 the	 post-2010	 development.	 These	 results	 also	
point	to	a	paradox	with	worrying	consequences	for	policy	makers:	over	the	past	years,	the	
Dutch	 government	 has	made	 very	 substantial	 investments	 in	 the	 BES	 islands,	 far	more	 so	
than	 in	Aruba,	Curaçao	or	 St.	Maarten.	Per	 capita,	 the	 three	municipalities	 received	 some	
10,000	euros	 annually,	 easily	 ten	 times	 as	much	 as	 the	Dutch	budget	 for	 the	 three	Dutch	
Caribbean	 countries.	 Surely	 this	 has	 resulted	 in	 improvements	 in	 education,	 public	 health	
and	infrastructure	which	are	explicitly	appreciated,	but	the	recent	changes	have	not	erased	
and	 possibly	 even	 increased	 private	 poverty.	Moreover,	 there	 are	 apparently	 widespread	
feelings	 of	 disenfranchisement	 and	 relative	 deprivation	 that	 are	 summed	 up	 in	 angry	
accusations	of	‘recolonization’,	‘modern	slavery’	and	‘apartheid’.	
Surely	the	Dutch	governmental	return	and	the	stepping	up	of	investments	did	not	stem	from	
an	 expectations	 of	 easy	 solutions,	 let	 alone	 rewards,	 but	 rather	 from	 a	 conviction	 that	
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decades	 of	 neglect	 ought	 to	 be	 repaired,	 in	 the	 first	 place	 for	 the	 good	 of	 the	 Dutch	
Caribbean	population.	As	it	has	turned	out	so	far	however,	results	have	been	mixed,	most	of	
all	 in	 Bonaire	 and	 St.	 Eustatius,	 precisely	where	 Dutch	 presence	 is	most	 visible.	 This	may	
serve	as	a	 sobering	 reminder	against	 an	 implicitly	 colonial-style,	 ‘for	 you	but	without	 you’	
approach	to	developmental	problems.	It	also	underlines	that	it	is	extremely	difficult	to	make	






The	 ambiguous	 attitudes	 vis-à-vis	 the	non-sovereign	 status	 can	be	observed	 in	other	non-
sovereign	 polities	 as	 well,	 in	 the	 Caribbean	 and	 beyond.	 Publications	 about	 American,	
British,	 Danish,	 French,	 and	 New	 Zealand	 overseas	 territories	 reveal	 that	 in	 all	 these	
jurisdictions,	 the	 non-sovereign	 political	 arrangement	 is	 occasionally	 or	 permanently	
contested.	While	 independence	movements	mostly	 remain	 small,	 and	 the	 choice	 for	 non-
sovereignty	 remains	 favored	 by	 wide	 popular	 majorities,	 the	 specific	 details	 of	 the	 non-




least	 for	 the	Dutch	Caribbean,	such	assessments	 	underestimate	 the	strong	emotional	and	
ideological	objections	to	the	non-sovereign	relationship	that	exist	among	the	populations	of	
such	territories.	
While	 no	 former	 overseas	 territories	 have	 become	 independent	 states	 over	 the	 past	 two	
decades,	there	have	been	myriad	changes	in	the	specific	non-sovereign	status	of	the	British,	
Danish,	 Dutch,	 and	 French	 overseas	 territories.	 These	 constant	 changes	 show	 that	 non-
sovereignty	is	an	inherently	unstable	political	outcome,	as	“status	issues	in	the	territories	are	
never	 fully	 resolved”	 (Aldrich	 and	 Connell	 1998,	 24).	 Whatever	 the	 merits	 of	 all	 this	
institutional	and	constitutional	fine-tuning,	it	seems	that		the	ambiguities	of	non-sovereignty	
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